At the outset of this discourse, it is pertinent to reflect upon the rapid passage of time, as we find ourselves at the commencement of the year 2024. To Begin … am still asking myself, 2024 already? Where did 2023 go? This moment provides an opportune juncture to extend a cordial welcome to all, coupled with the hope that the recent year-end festivities were a source of joy and rejuvenation. Although intentions were set to author a comprehensive retrospective analysis of the preceding year - a 'Year That Was, (TYTW)' synopsis1, - various engagements, including travel, necessitated a revision of these plans. Notably, the transition from 2023 to 2024 was marked by my presence in India, followed by a visit to the United Arab Emirates for the New Year's celebration, specifically in Sharjah. For those inclined towards a more detailed exposition of my experiences, I have chronicled them at the following link: http://tinyurl.com/2tdxbvjd .
As we navigate the nascent year, it behoves us to turn our attention to the emergent challenges at the global, continental, and local levels. A particularly salient issue is the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), or maritime accord signed between Ethiopia and the separatist region of Somaliland. In an effort to maintain transparency and intellectual honesty, I must forthrightly state that I perceive this accord as a flagrant contravention of established international legal norms. To succinctly recapitulate the widely reported media narrative: Under the terms of the MoU, executed on January 1st, represents a pivotal moment with far-reaching consequences and marking a significant shift in the regional dynamics of the Horn of Africa. Somaliland consented to lease a 20-kilometer stretch of Somalia’s coastline to landlocked Ethiopia for a duration of half a century. This lease is intended to facilitate the establishment of a Red Sea port, for Ethiopia, which has signalled its intention to construct a base for its Navy as well as a commercial port.
Ethiopia’s initial formal response to this agreement was encapsulated in a statement characterizing the MoU with President Muse Bihi Abdi of Somaliland as “historic” Memorandum of Understanding (MoU'. Despite the veneer of diplomatic propriety, underlying themes of historical colonialist presumptuousness were less subtly articulated by Ethiopia, which proclaimed, “Accordingly, we have made great effort to explain our position to all who are able and willing to listen.” The MoU additionally posits this agreement as a critical step in Ethiopia's quest to reclaim maritime access, a privilege lost owing to a confluence of historical events and legal precedents. The implications of such a stance are profound and warrant serious contemplation by all stakeholders committed to fostering peace and stability in the Horn of Africa. It is imperative to comprehend the intricacies of this situation. While Somaliland has openly committed to providing naval access to Ethiopia in exchange for political recognition, Ethiopia's public stance on this provision remains less explicit. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has expressed a welcoming attitude towards Somaliland's government’s declaration, further mentioning potential equity participation in Ethiopian enterprises such as Ethiopia Telecom or Ethiopian Airlines.
The facts:
Ethiopia’s first detailed and significant statement following the signing of what it described as a ) with Somaliland’s President Muse Bihi Abdi , mentioned to include provisions for the Ethiopian government to make an in-depth assessment towards taking a position regarding the efforts of Somaliland to gain recognition.
It is important that we understand the above clearly. While Somaliland formally acknowledged providing sea access to Ethiopia for Naval Forces in return for recognition, Ethiopia was not publicly about the provision. However, it “welcome[s] the statement by the government of the Somaliland.” Adding shares would be given to Somaliland from Ethiopia Telecom or Ethiopian Airlines.
While the above can be accepted as diplomatic niceties, the ancient colonial arrogance was not that subtle as Ethiopia continues to say that ‘“Accordingly, we have made great effort to explain our position to all who are able and willing to listen”. Then this: The MOU continues to mention that it is a significant step towards Ethiopia’s goal of regaining access to the sea, lost due to historical and legal circumstances. Historical and legal circumstances are operative words, what exactly does this mean? And this should rightly worry all who care about peaceful coexistence in the Horn of Africa.
Unsurprisingly, the Cabinet of Somalia, under the leadership of Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre, responded with a declaration of non-toleration for breaches of its territorial sovereignty, denouncing Ethiopia’s participation in the MoU as an infringement of Somalia’s territorial integrity and deeming the actions “null and void.” This sentiment was echoed by the international community, with the United Nations, African Union, United States, European Union, China, the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and other regional bodies supporting Somalia’s defense of its territorial integrity and urging Ethiopia to align with established international norms. The geopolitical implications of this accord are evident, with Arab League Secretary-General Ahmed Aboul Gheit characterizing the memorandum as an assault on Arab, African, and international principles and a blatant violation of international law. The geographical significance of the area in question cannot be overstated, given its status as one of the world's busiest maritime corridors, leading to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.
Brief(est) history of the issue:
To provide a brief historical context, Somaliland, a former British protectorate situated along the Gulf of Aden, unilaterally declared its independence from Somalia in 1991. However, it has not received international recognition and thus remains, both de facto and de jure, a part of Somalia. Ethiopia, Africa’s second-most populous nation, has been actively seeking access to the sea since Eritrea, with its Red Sea coastline, attained independence in 1993.
In October 2023, the Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed described the sea access as "an existential issue for his country", with this statement leading to concerns that this implied seizing land from neighboring Eritrea, which gained independence from Ethiopia in 1991 after the war of Independence, which lasted from 1961 to 1991. This has led to the establishment of two separate nations. The separation resulted in Ethiopia losing direct access to the Red Sea and key ports. A similar 2018 deal which would have given Ethiopia a 19% stake in the port of Berbera, alongside a 51% stake going to Emirati logistics company DP World holding a 51% share, was abandoned in 2022.
The African Union (AU) and IGAD have urged dialogue amidst the growing tensions. The IGAD Secretariat, led by former Ethiopian Foreign Minister Workneh Gebeyehu, will play a facilitative role in the summit despite coming under fire from Somali leaders this week for his statement. Workneh expressed "deep concern" regarding the deteriorating relationship between Ethiopia and Somalia, emphasizing the importance of closely monitoring the situation. The Somali government felt that his statement fell short and demanded an apology and retraction from Workneh, alleging bias in his statements. Gebeyehu is an Ethiopian national.
Ethiopian government officials have also expressed dissatisfaction with IGAD's handling of the situation, as reported by sources from Ethiopia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At a recent event, Ethiopia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledged feeling global pressure over the MoU, as various countries and international organizations have shown support for Somalia. President Mohamud recently visited Eritrea for talks with President Isaias Afwerki and Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry. Egyptian President Abdelfattah El-Sisi, who is also involved in a dispute with Ethiopia over the GERD Dam, has shown immediate support for Somalia's sovereignty, inviting President Mohamud to Cairo for further discussions.
Current status: On Wednesday (18 Jan 2023) the IGAD Heads of State & Government are In Kampala, Uganda, for an extraordinary session of . The special session, convened by Djibouti's president and IGAD Chairman, Ismail Omar Guelleh, which come barely 48 hours after an unscheduled Ethiopian Airlines flight ferrying high-level government officials was turned away from Somali airspace.
Ethiopia, citing scheduling conflicts, has declined to attend the IGAD session. The Sudanese government has withdrawn from attending the summit. This decision stems from the need for direct discussions between Sudan's top military leaders, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemetti), before engaging in broader dialogues. Following this decision, Sudan has severed ties with the regional body.
Ineffective AU role : The AU's Peace and Security Council said it had heard representatives of Ethiopia and Somalia in Addis Ababa and urged the Horn of Africa neighbors to pursue "meaningful dialogue". "Council expressed deep concern over the ongoing tension ... and its potential adverse impact on peace, security and stability of the region," a statement said. The council called on Ethiopia and Somalia "to exercise restraint, de-escalate and engage in meaningful dialogue toward finding a peaceful resolution of the matter." That will not cut and will certainly not stop Ethiopia’s aggression and irrational ambition.
Way ahead: It is clear this is an imported crisis, and the only winners are external forces who are pulling the strings to ensure the longevity of their hegemony. IGAD and the leaders of the Horn of Africa much like a skilled chess players must anticipate the moves and adjusts swiftly to surprises. Just as in chess, choosing the right piece and moving it in the correct direction is vital, and that is where our leaders have failed.
I think there is still room for diplomacy, starting with bilateral discussions. There is a major role for Somali diplomats to engage their counterparts around the world and use consistent and clear message. The Somali government must demand the removal of the former Ethiopian Foreign Minister Workneh Gebeyehu, and now IGAD Executive Secretary immediately to avoid IGAD’s slow death.
In conclusion, the MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland, while a strategic move for both parties who are politically and financially bankrupt, has stirred significant geopolitical unrest, challenged established international norms and raising concerns over regional stability.
Prof Mohamed Hassan2, a Somali national and former Ethiopian diplomat covers this issues succinctly, I would like recommend this clip to you all, see https://www.youtube.com/live/C_SMxQbcnJU?si=DZSHws0eFv-gZfUI .
For the record, Mohamed Hassan Qoslaye is an old friend of mine. I met him in Mogadishu while I was 1970s. I was a primary school student and learnt a lot from him.